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1. The Contestants' Hypocritical Reliance on the March 1993 Documents. 
The Contestants repeatedly seek to bolster their arguments that Rikki and Joe 
acted reprehensibly by asserting Rikki and Joe failed to follow the terms of the 1993 
Irrevocable Trust (Exhibit 4) and the 1993 Amendment to the Marital and Family Trusts 
(Exhibit 3). See Appellees' Brief at 26-29, 33, 35, 38. This is rank hypocrisy. The 
Contestants have never sought to enforce the 1993 Trust Amendment. That document 
named John, Joe, and Rikki as the sole trustees of the Marital and Family Trusts. Exhibit 
3. If one could not serve, the others were to serve; there was no other provision for 
successors. Id. Not one of the affidavits the Contestants executed claimed the right to 
act as Trustee based on the 1993 Trust Amendment. See Exhibits 13, 17, and 18. Not 
one of those affidavits sought to remove John as a Trustee. Moreover, when the 
Contestants sought a declaratory judgment in November 1997, they did not even advise 
the Court of the 1993 Amendment, much less seek to have its terms enforced. R. 1244-
48 (Linnea's Motion and Memorandum), R.1249-53 (Dwight's), 1254-58 (John's). 
The Contestants never viewed the 1993 Amendment as controlling (until Linnea 
and the Contestants made these specious arguments at trial and now on appeal) because 
the Contestants knew their father was incompetent to execute that document. Linnea 
testified that Mac would sign anything that was put in front of him, T.291, and that his 
inability to remember matters led her to conclude she should not trust anything he might 
tell her. T.340. When Linnea sought a conservatorship and guardianship for her father in 
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July 1993, she attached a copy of Dwight's April 1993 Declaration to her petition. 
Exhibit 205. In that sworn statement, Dwight stated his father was incompetent and 
described his father's deteriorating mental condition. Exhibit 204, p , 5-7. John testified 
his father was incompetent by October 1993, but he could not really say earlier because 
he was not around his father that much. T.603. Rikki testified that John told her 
everyone laughed when Mac signed the March 1993 documents because they all knew 
Mac was incompetent. T.847. The trial court found that Mac "began to fail and edged 
into incompetency" in 1992 (R.1948). 
Thus, when the Contestants rely for support of their arguments on the 1993 Trust 
(Exhibit 4) and the 1993 Amendment (Exhibit 3), they are engaging in chicanery. 
Whenever they do so, the Court should hold them accountable for this hypocritical 
position. 
2. Rikki and Joe Properly Moved for Judgment on the Pleadings. 
The Contestants argue that a motion for judgment on the pleadings must be made 
prior to trial. Appellees' Brief at 11. Rikki and Joe could not have done that. Dwight 
did not withdraw his pending motion until the day before trial. R. 1745. Rikki and Joe 
moved for judgment based on the lack of any pleadings seeking relief at the earliest 
possible time. T.19 (Dwight's withdrawal was handed to counsel the morning of trial). 
Rule 12(c) only requires that the motion not delay the trial. The trial continued as 
scheduled on September 24, 1999, notwithstanding the motion. T.l. Had the motion 
been granted, it would have saved all parties the expense of proceeding with trial. 
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The Contestants also argue that Judge Harding specifically set for trial the 
question of whether any beneficiary's share should be "offset for expenses owed the 
estate." Appellees' Brief at 12. The issue here is whether Judge Harding's reservation 
gave notice to Kikki and Joe of what tlit" < 'onli'sfttiih were claiming. Prior to trial, Rikki 
and Joe had notice of what Dwight and John were claiming. R.1600 (Dwight); R.1707 
(John). But both withdrew their motions before trial. R. 1731 (John); R. 1731 (Dwight). 
Linnea filed no pleading wit!" • iat gave ai ly notice to wh • j^ents ai id 
claims she would make at trial. As the record shows, it was Linnea's counsel who 
conducted the trial on behalf of the Contestants. T. 10 seriatim; in particular see T.47 
lines 13 and 18 As of the morning of trial, there was no pleading or i notion pending 
upon which relief coi ild be granted by the trial court.1 
As a final point, the Contestants claim that Rikki and Joe were seeking to enforce 
only part of Judge Harding's Order. That is true only because the balance of Judge 
Harding's Ordei restated w hat the Tn ists, Exhibits 1 and 2, i eqiiii e tl iat all assets be 
distributed to the five children in equal shares. Whether or not Judge Harding had 
restated that as part of his Order, Rikki's and Joe's motion for a judgment based on the 
lack of pleadings was well taken iintl should have been framed The (nail court should 
have ordered an immediate distribution to the children in equal shares. 
1
 Moreover, even if Judge Harding's reservation is deemed to be adequate notice of 
Linnea's unpled claims for "offsets," there is no basis for finding it supports a claim for attorney 
fees. 
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3. The Trial Court Improperly Awarded Attorney Fees to Linnea. 
The dispute over the award of attorney fees revolves around who breached their 
duties and to what extent. The trial court found Rikki and Joe breached their duties in 
several respects, and it did not discuss whether the Contestants breached their duties as 
majority trustees. 
The Contestants accuse Rikki and Joe of: (i) "unlawfully usurping the authority of 
the trust" and "the powers of the trustee," (Appellees' Brief at 1, 7, 26, 40); (ii) 
"improperly applying] funds to their own benefit and not for trust purposes" {Id. at 7); 
(iii) repeatedly committing "bad faith, oppressive, and illegal acts," {Id. at 36); (iv) taking 
actions that were "illegal, against the express purposes and intent of the Trusts [that] 
constituted serious breaches of their duties" {Id. at 9); (v) using "deceitful" conduct to 
recover trust monies from Leora {Id. at 9); (vi) "gross violations of their duties as 
trustees" {Id. at 9-10); (vi) of "numerous breaches of duty" {Id, at 10, 36); (vii) 
"flagrantly]" disregarding "the court's order to provide an accounting" {Id. at 18); (viii) 
engaging in "oppressive conduct" by failing to provide accountings (Id.); (ix) 
"threatening] to waste trust assets on litigation if the siblings tried to assert their right to 
be trustee" (Id. at 18) (x) engaging in conduct that was "bad faith, vexatious, wanton, and 
oppressive" (Id. at 18-19); (xi) systematically and continuously denying Linnea access to 
records (Id. at 28-29); (xii) never providing an accounting (Id. at 29, 30); (xiii) pursuing a 
"deceptive and unsuccessful action" in California (Id. at 34) that was "entirely a] 
charade and a waste of time and trust assets" (Id. at 35). 
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1 his is ai gi in lei it by bombast. None of these accusations was part of the lower 
court's Memorandum Decision. R.1935-1960. Only in a few instances do the 
Contestants cite the record in making these allegations, and the citations are generally 
inaccurate. Tin; ( 'otifestaiits pu>\ ulr im ttsisoiinj nnalvsis of the law applied lo Ihr record 
and the lower court's findings of fact. 
The Time Line in Which the Trustee Dispute Arose 
While the Contestants inaccurately clai : were entilled to serv e as 
Trustees of the Family Trust from 1979 when Bob Bennett resigned (compare Appellees' 
Brief at 21-23 with Appellants' Brief at 23-24), they acknowledge they did not assert 
their claim to be trustees until after Mac's death in May of 1995 (1 412-13), Appellees' 
Brief at 38.2 Thereafter, on June 6, 1995, the Contestants executed their first affidavit of 
successor trusteeship. Exhibit 13. In it, they relied upon their interpretation of Section 
6.01(c) and 6.02(c) of the 1987 Trust to support their claim to being co-Trustees of the 
FannIv and Manlal Trusts iili-Jjuls did iml il.inii ;i rmhl lo «:nt a>. eo»Trustees of 
the Family Trust under the 1974 Trust until October 17, 1995. Exhibit 18. After Dwight 
started this litigation with his Unlawful Detainer Action on May 6, 1996, R.177, Rikki, 
Joe, and Linnea sought to avoid ft H thei litigation b> executing Exhibit 16 on May 20, 
1996. That document appointed Rikki and Linnea as Trustees. Rikki and Joe expressly 
2
 John sought appointment on earlier dates. T.5 77. However, he asked Rikki and 
Joe to make him a Trustee, T.576, something the Contestants correctly state that trustee 
Robert Bennett could not do in May 1979. Appellees' Brief at 23. Nor could Rikki and 
Joe appoint John Trustee. John never asked his father to be a trustee. T.602. 
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reserved the right to assert their right to be Trustees if the settlement was not successful. 
See footnote 1, Exhibit 16. When Linnea decided the settlement was not working, she 
and her brothers executed their final affidavit on October 15, 1996. Exhibit 17. 
This summary constitutes the entire time line of the trustee dispute because on the 
following day, October 16, 1996, the parties stipulated to the appointment of an 
independent accountant to handle the administration of the trust and to a provision that no 
party would claim to be a trustee of the trusts. R.802-06, Tfl 1, [^16. The lower court's 
Order effecting that stipulation remained in effect until the Declaratory Judgment of 
March 1998 that appointed all five children as Trustees. R. 1324-27. 
After the Declaratory Judgment was entered, the Contestants, acting as majority 
trustees, sought to enforce their Final Settlement Ballot. R. 1417-20. 
Accordingly, the trustee dispute began on June 6, 1995 and continued until 
October 16, 1996. It is during this time frame only that the court's finding that Rikki and 
Joe engaged in a "persistent pattern" of denying the Contestants their "right" to be 
trustees must be measured. R.1937. Thereafter, the parties stipulated to an independent 
trustee until March 1998, and after March, 1998, it was the Contestants exercising their 
rights as majority trustees whose actions were disputed. 
Rikki and Joe Properly Administered the Trusts 
The trial court found Rikki and Joe paid themselves excessive trustee fees, that 
they improperly paid California attorney Middaugh $5,230 for services regarding the 
California Conservatorship proceeding, and that they failed "to regularly account" after 
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the Hedrick accountin June 1994. R. 1946-47, 1942, 1937. With these exceptions, 
the court approved every other aspect of their administration. See generally R. 1935-60. 
Paul Shields' report, which covers only 1990 through 1996, shows that there were 
thousands ai id tl 101 isands of ti ai lsactioi is .Exhibits 5A ai id 5B I o begii I his work, Mr. 
Shields used Rikki's Quicken files and stated that they were very reliable. T.234. There 
was no finding of fault with the day-to-day administration of the trusts. R.1935-60. 
Moreover, Robert Bennett, husband of I ii n lea Bei :n lett, e\ en testified that "11 lad a lot of 
respect for Rikki and I still do" (explaining why he signed the 1979 Trustee Resignation 
document purporting to appoint Rikki as his successor). T.491; Exhibit 25. 
Rikki and Joe Never Usurped the Trusteeship 
The trial coi ii t nev ei I lsed the word "usurp" - and with good reason. Mac 
appointed Joe, Robert Bennett and himself to be the original trustees. Exhibit 1. Mac 
asked Bob Bennett to sign an acceptance of trusteeship. T.485-86; Exhibit 23. Mac 
asked Bob Bennett to resigi I ai id appoii it R ikki as a successoi trust* - *. 48/-489; 
Exhibit 25. Both documents were prepared by the drafter of the 1974 Trust, attorney 
Michael Loveridge. R. 491, 656. During his life, Mac chose not to appoint the 
Contestants I\ lac, not Rik ki ai id Joe, established who the trustees w oi 1.1ci be. 
When Mac revised his trust in 1987, attorney Doug Morrison prepared the 
document. Mac again chose who the trustees would be. Exhibit 2, §6.01 and §6.02; T.79. 
Mac also chose to send an explanation of the Trust to his children rather than the Trust 
itself Exhibit 47. As the drafter of the 1987 Trust, Mr. Morrison explained that Rikki 
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and Joe would serve subject to removal by Mac until they were unwilling or unable to 
serve. Id. Throughout this litigation, based on the summary that Mac asked the drafter of 
the 1987 Trust to prepare and years of conversations with their father (R. 1950-51, 1937), 
Rikki and Joe have believed that they are the only persons authorized to be trustees. 
Under Utah law "[a] trustee is not liable to a beneficiary to the extent that the trustee 
acted in reasonable reliance on the provisions of the trust." Utah Code §75-7-302(2). No 
matter how inaccurate Mr. Loveridge's and Mr. Morrison's advice, Rikki and Joe 
properly relied upon their guidance. Utah Code §75-7-402(3)(y) (a trustee has the power 
"to employ . . . attorneys" and is authorized "to act without independent investigation 
upon their recommendations"). Nonetheless, the Contestants simply ignore Mac's 
actions as trustor of the trusts, Mr. Loveridge's actions as the drafter of the 1974 Trust, 
and Mr. Morrison's actions as the drafter of the 1987 Trust. Their repeated accusations 
(T. 33,42, 355, 356, 363, 378,431, 551, 633, 791; Appellees' Brief at 1, 7, 26,40) that 
Rikki and Joe "usurped" the trusteeship are baseless. 
Rikki and Joe Never Improperly Applied Funds for Their Own Purpose 
With the possible exception of paying too much in trustee fees, the court fully 
exonerated Rikki and Joe from the claim that they improperly applied funds for their own 
purposes. R. 1939-40. The monies paid to Mr. Middaugh regarding the California 
conservatorship led to an immediate order that Mac was incompetent and gave Joe the 
authority to negotiate a settlement with Leora. T. 1236. That fulfilled Rikki's and Joe's 
goals of preventing anyone from having Mac execute new documents and recovering the 
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$100,000 Leora took. T.l 175; see also R.1943 (court's finding that trust recovered 
$100,000 for the benefit of all beneficiaries). Moreover, assuming the court correctly set 
Rikki's and Joe's trustee fees, it was nonetheless proper for Rikki and Joe to pay 
themselves trustee fees. Exhibit 2; §6.05; Utah Code §75-7-206. 
There Was Never a Threat to Waste Trust Assets on Litigation 
The court found that Joe told Linnea on several occasions regarding the California 
conservatorship proceedings that he would prevail because he had trust funds to support 
his side, and she could not afford the litigation. R.1944. There is nothing sinister about 
this. In contrast, the Contestants mischaracterize the trial court finding, stating it "cited 
Joe's threat to waste the trust estates on litigation if the siblings tried to assert their rights 
to act as trustees." Appellees' Brief at 18. This is simply false. 
Rikki and Joe Acted in Good Faith. 
The trial court never found Rikki and Joe acted in bad faith. The court tempered 
its harshest criticism - Rikki and Joe "engaged in a persistent pattern aimed at remaining 
trustees without interference from their siblings" - with its admission that "[t]here was 
some reason for their behavior." R.1937 (citing as reasons for their behavior instructions 
from Mac and the inflexible and obtuse positions taken by John and Dwight). For an 
analysis of all of the trial court's criticisms, see Appellants' Brief at 23-33. 
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The Importance of Analyzing Rikki's and Joe's Conduct 
In Dardovitch v. Haltzman, the Federal Third Circuit Court of Appeals considered 
whether a trial court had properly refused to award attorney fees against a Trustee who 
breached its fiduciary duties. In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals held: 
Unlike liability for a breach of trust, which is based only on a reasonable 
care test, an award of attorney's fees against a trustee, as discussed above, 
turns on the defendant's active culpability. The District Court found that 
[the trustee's] conduct arose from "excusable neglect," and not bad faith, 
especially in comparison with Haltzman, Dardovitch, 1998 WL 13271 at 8, 
and excused her from liability for the attorney's fees. We find no error in 
this conclusion. 
190 F.3d 125, 150 (Third Cir. 1999). See generally, 9 A.L.R.2d 1132, A.M. Swarthout, 
"Allowance of Attorneys' Fees In, or Other Costs Of, Litigation by Beneficiary 
Respecting Trust" (1950; supplement through March 2000) (a trustee must act 
egregiously before beneficiary will be awarded attorney fees from the trustee). While the 
trial court did not find "excusable neglect", its analysis of Joe's and Rikki's actions did 
identify ameliorating factors. More importantly, the court did not find that Rikki and Joe 
acted in bad faith. For these reasons, the trial court should not have awarded attorney 
fees against Rikki and Joe. 
Linnea's Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
On the other hand, as to Linnea, the Contestants dismiss Rikki's and Joe's analysis 
of her conduct as a trustee (see Appellants' Brief at 18-19) on the basis that "the evidence 
shows no improper conduct." Appellees' Brief at 9. They falsely claim Linnea never 
acted as a trustee. Id. at 16. Regarding Linnea's part in voting as a majority trustee for 
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and seeking distribution based on the June 1998 Final Settlement Ballot and the March 
1999 Revised Ballot, they argue Linnea and her brothers were simply engaged in "an 
attempt to redistribute the Trust in a manner that would be fair" to all the parties. (Id. at 
16). 
Linnea clearly acted as a Trustee. On June 6, 1998, two months after the court's 
Declaratory Judgment appointing Linnea a Trustee, she executed Exhibit 20 as a Trustee. 
See Exhibit 20, last page. 
The Contestants have made no effort to demonstrate the "fairness" of the ballots. 
There is nothing remotely "fair" about what the Contestants did as majority trustees when 
they executed the Final Settlement Ballot, Exhibit 20. See Appellants' Brief at 18-19. 
A trustee has a fundamental duty to distribute a trust in accordance with the terms 
of the trust. Utah Code §75-7-301; §75-7-302(10); c.f §75-3-703 (duty of personal 
representative to administer estate in accordance with probated will). This Trust directed 
an equal distribution to the five children. Exhibits 1 and 2. If the majority Trustees 
believed that the trust should not be followed for some reason, absent consent of all 
beneficiaries, they had a duty to obtain a court order approving that variance. G. Bogert, 
Trusts, §145 - §147 West Pub. 6th Ed. (1987); C.f. Utah Code §75-3-912 (allowing 
modification of an estate plan when beneficiaries unanimously concur); §75-3-1101 
(allowing modification with a court order). Rather than seeking a court order approving 
their plan, the Contestants did everything they could to enforce their vote without court 
interference. 
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Dwight and John, with Linnea's acquiescence, repeatedly sought to enforce these 
ballots. R.1424, 1431, 1442, 1451, 1600, 1668,1707, 1763, 1768, 1769, 1774, 1783, 
1827, 1842. To prevent the ballots from controlling the distribution of the estate, Rikki 
and Joe not only objected at the status conference on September 8, 1998 (R.1427), they 
filed four separate memoranda responding to the efforts John and Dwight made 
attempting to enforce those ballots. R.1559, R.1633, R.1671, R.1735. In addition, John 
and Dwight took up valuable court time at trial making these same arguments. See e.g. 
T. 11 et seq.\ T.543 et seq. Dwight and John could not have done this if Linnea had not 
joined in their efforts, or if she had ever repudiated her vote on the ballots. But for 
Rikki's and Joe's objections, the Contestants would have distributed this estate contrary 
to the terms of the trust. See Court's Order dated March 17, 1999, R.1552. The 
Contestants' distribution plan as majority trustees was neither fair nor legal. 
When trustees choose not to follow the express terms of a trust and seek to avoid 
the court's supervision of their actions, they breach their duties. When they repeatedly 
seek to do so, they seriously breach their duties. Far from being guiltless, Linnea 
executed both Ballots and never repudiated her signatures. These actions alone 
disqualify her for receiving attorney fees in this proceeding. 76 Am. Jur. 2d (1992, 
Supp.1997), Trusts, §737 ("courts allow a trustee to recover attorney fees from the trust 
after the trustee successfully defends allegations of a breach of fiduciary duty"). 
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4. To Award Attorney Fees, the Court Should Determine the Prevailing Party. 
Rikki and Joe submit that the Supreme Court's dicta in Stewart requires a 
prevailing party analysis. See Appellants' Brief at 16. In this regard, the Contestants 
correctly note that a party need not win all aspects of their case in order to be a prevailing 
party. Brown v. Richards, 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992). 
However, Rikki and Joe were the true prevailing parties. Judge Maetani ordered a two 
day evidentiary hearing because the Contestants had exercised their rights as majority 
trustees based on the court's March 1998 Declaratory Judgment to vote for the 
distributions set forth in their June 1998 Final Settlement Ballot. R.1427. It was only 
because Rikki and Joe objected to that distribution at the status hearing on September 8, 
1998 that the trial court ordered an evidentiary hearing on the Contestants' actions as 
trustees. Id. Rikki and Joe were successful in preventing any part of the June 1998 or 
March 1999 Ballots from becoming part of the court's Order. Compare Exhibits 20 and 
RASSlwith the trial court's Memorandum Decision, R. 1935-60. Thus, given the 
procedural history leading to the trial below, Rikki and Joe have the better claim to being 
a prevailing party than any of the Contestants. 
5. Rikki and Joe Should Receive Trustee Fees Based on the Proper Standard. 
The Contestants argue that Rikki and Joe are not entitled to trustee fees because 
they served illegally as trustees. This is factually false. Each time the Contestants sought 
to become trustees, they appointed Rikki and Joe as co-Trustees. Exhibits 13, 17, 18. 
Moreover, where Rikki and Joe served under documents prepared by an attorney that 
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expressly appointed them trustees, if that appointment was invalid, they were still de 
facto trustees. C.f. Thompson v. Mitchell, 222 P. 617 (Wash. 1924) (de facto trustee held 
to same standard of care as de jure trustee). 
The Trial Court's Discretion in Awarding Trustee Fees 
When a trustee breaches its duty, a trial court has wide discretion in awarding 
trustee fees. It can authorize full fees, authorize reduced fees, or authorize no fees. 
Restatement of Trusts (Second) §243 (1959). The Comments to Section 243 of the 
Restatement of Trusts (Second) describe the considerations that should be made in 
deciding whether a breaching trustee is entitled to full, partial or no compensation: 
(1) whether the trustee acted in good faith or not; (2) whether the breach of 
trust was intentional or negligent or without fault; (3) whether the breach of 
trust related to the management of the whole trust or related only to a part 
of the trust property; (4) whether or not the breach of trust occasioned any 
loss and whether if there has been a loss it has been made good by the 
trustee; (5) whether the trustee's services were of value to the trust. 
Id. Under this analysis, full compensation is appropriate. Rikki and Joe were exonerated 
on the bulk of the claims. The only loss that was incurred under the trial court's analysis 
was the $5,230 paid to Mr. Middaugh. That "breach" was certainly not intentional where 
it led to the recovery of $100,000 of trust assets, and it only related to the $5,230 paid 
and possibly the $100,000 recovered, not the entire trust estate. The $5,230 "loss" was 
recovered as part of the court's order. Given the number of transactions and the years of 
faithful service, Rikki and Joe provided a valuable service to the trust. Thus, they were 
entitled to full fees for their service. 
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Here, the trial court found Rikki and Joe breached their duties by refusing to allow 
their siblings to act as trustees, by failing to regularly account, and by paying Mr. 
Middaugh in connection with the California conservatorship. Even so, it authorized full 
fees. R.1947 (the trial court sought to determine a "reasonable fee commensurate with 
fees charged by other trustees for similar services.") 
When the trial court set those fees, it did so based on the wrong standard. Rather 
than determining what was reasonable compensation as required by Utah Code Section 
75-7-206, and the terms of the 1987 Trust Agreement, Exhibit 2, Section 6.05, the trial 
court set compensation based on what it determined was an agreement between Rikki and 
Mac that it then applied to Joe. R. 1946. 
Finally, the Contestants make the claim that the trial court gave Rikki and Joe fair 
warning that it had prejudged this issue. Appellees' Brief at 32. That hardly constitutes a 
justification for then ignoring Rikki's and Joe's testimony concerning the value of the 
trust (Exhibit 44 at 10, R733-34; T.734) and their testimony describing what they did and 
how much time they spent. T.643-48 (Rikki); T. 1155-57 (Joe); Appellants' Brief at 35. 
6. Rikki and Joe have properly appealed the March 1998 Declaratory 
Judgment. 
The Contestants claim that Rikki and Joe are precluded from appealing the March 
1998 Declaratory Judgment because they should have done so within thirty days after 
that judgment was entered. Appellees' Brief at 20-21. The cases cited in support of this 
proposition all validate appeals taken prior to the end of the administration of the estate. 
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While a court may properly take a "pragmatic" view of an appeal and hear it before the 
estate is closed, it does not follow that a court should use this approach to exclude an 
appeal that is otherwise timely. It would be appropriate and helpful for the Court of 
Appeals to make this point. Otherwise, probate litigators will have to appeal every 
intermediate order entered in a probate case to prevent a later determination that the 
lower court's order decided an "issue of vital importance" or "removed a cloud of 
uncertainty" in the litigation. Kelly v. West One Bank, 311 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 933 P.2d 
1015 (Ct. App. 1997). The "pragmatic" view may be used to validate appeals before the 
end of a probate case, but it should not invalidate later appeals, absent a URCP Rule 
54(b) certification. With regard to Rule 54(b), the Court should note that the judgment 
being appealed in this case was certified under Rule 54(b) (R.2268), and the March 1998 
Declaratory Judgment was not. R. 1324-27 
Moreover, even if the Contestants are correct that the "pragmatic" view can be 
used to prevent a later appeal, the facts of this case would not support its application. As 
the briefs make clear, the issue for all parties is who gets what. There was nothing about 
the March 1998 Declaratory Judgment that resolved that issue. In fact, it specifically 
reserved jurisdiction of future disputes, R.1325, p , disputes that could only logically 
relate to who gets what. 
Rikki and Joe properly appealed the March 1998 Declaratory Judgment as part of 
this appeal. R.2275 (Notice of Appeal). 
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7. If the 1974 Trust was not amendable, Joe has always been a Trustee of the 
Family Trust, and he is the only Trustee since Mac's death. 
In response to Rikki's and Joe's analysis of Utah Code Section 75-7-405(2) and its 
application to the priority of trustees under the 1974 Trust, Appellants' Brief at 23-24, the 
Contestants argue that Mac's attempt to have Robert delegate his duties to Rikki 
extinguished the second priority. Appellant's Brief at 37. They also argue that it is 
"abundantly clear" that Mac was a "necessary constituent" of the second priority. Id. 
They never explain either of these points. Importantly, they never discuss Utah Code 
Section 75-7-405(2). Appellants' Brief at 23. 
The Contestants further argue that Mac's direction to have Robert Bennett 
delegate his duties to Rikki was based on Mac's "knowledge" that without that, the 
second priority was extinguished. Appellees' Brief at 23. There is no evidence to 
support this allegation. If Mac thought this, he was mistaken. Utah Code §75-7-405(2). 
Robert Bennett's resignation was valid. His delegation to Rikki was not. Utah 
Code §75-7-403(1). Thus, assuming the 1974 Family Trust was not amendable, Mac and 
Joe continued to serve as Trustees until Mac's death, and Joe continues to be entitled to 
serve as trustee of the Family Trust to this date. Utah Code §75-7-405(2). 
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8. Rikki and Joe were Entitled to Object to the Appointment of their Siblings as 
Trustees. 
If the Court of Appeals remands this case for further proceedings and there 
remains any issue regarding the propriety of Rikki's and Joe's actions in resisting the 
appointment of their siblings as Trustees, then in addition to all other defenses, Rikki and 
Joe should be allowed to defend their conduct by showing that their siblings were 
unqualified to serve as trustees. If there is no remand or if the Court holds that Rikki and 
Joe properly resisted the appointment of their siblings based on the instructions they 
received from Mr. Morrison (Exhibit 47), then this issue is moot. 
The Contestants cite no authority for their claim that Rikki and Joe had no legal 
basis to determine that their siblings were unqualified to be trustees. Appellees' Brief at 
36. Assuming that their siblings were unqualified, Rikki and Joe had authority both as 
the trustees and as beneficiaries of the trusts to resist their siblings efforts to become 
trustees. In re Lowe's Estate, 28 Utah 49 (Utah 1926). There is no authority to support 
the claim that Rikki and Joe had to let unqualified trustees serve and then petition to 
remove them. If one of the children had been profoundly retarded, no one would argue 
that the trustee had to let that child serve and then seek to remove him or her. Rikki and 
Joe should have been allowed to present evidence showing that their siblings were 
unqualified to act as trustees. The trial court erred in disallowing this evidence. 
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9. The Trial Court Properly Denied the Contestants' Claim that Rikki and Joe 
Should Pay NED's Fees. 
The Contestants claim that NED's fees should be paid by Rikki and Joe. First, 
Mr. Shields was both an investigator and an administrator. R.781, 806. There was no 
evidence stating how much of NED's fees were related to Mr. Shields' work as the 
independent administrator of the estate and how much was related to his investigative 
accounting. Without this evidence, there was no way the trial court could have awarded 
the costs of Mr. Shields' investigative accounting against Rikki and Joe. The parties had 
stipulated to the appointment of an independent accountant to administer the estate. 
R.806. For this reason, the trial court should have granted Rikki's and Joe's motion at 
the end of the Contestants' case to dismiss this claim. T.632-33. 
Second, contrary to the Contestants' claim that the NED accounting was "the first 
accounting that met the requirements of the Trust, the statutes or the court order ...," 
Appellees' Brief at 30, Mr. Shields undertook an investigative analysis. T.192. Thus, he 
testified that no accounting, no matter how complete, would have satisfied him because it 
would not be an investigative accounting. T.212-213. Moreover, the accounting he 
prepared had no beginning or ending inventory and no reconciliation of assets on hand to 
those shown on the accounting. Those are fundamental parts of any court accounting. 
C.f. UCJA Rule 6-504 (setting forth how to prepare a conservatorship accounting). 
Finally, the parties stipulated to the appointment of an independent accountant to 
investigate Rikki's and Joe's administration of the Trust. R.806. When the trial court 
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approved of NED's appointment, it incorporated its engagement letter into the court's 
order. R.780, \2. The engagement letter stated that NED's fees would be paid by the 
trust. R.776, 4th paragraph. 
Accordingly, there is no basis to reverse the trial court's ruling on this point. 
10. The Trial Court Correctly Denied John Hughes' Application for Fees. 
In its initial Memorandum Decision, the court awarded attorney fees only to 
Linnea Bennett. R.1936. Thereafter, John Hughes moved the court to amend this 
decision and award attorney fees to him for the work of Craig Carlile of Ray, Quinney, & 
Nebeker. R.1997. Mr. Hughes submitted the affidavit of Craig Carlile in support of that 
motion. R.2042. A short review of that affidavit shows that it provides no evidence of 
what Mr. Carlile actually did, when he did it, or how long he spent. R. 2036-2042. The 
supporting exhibit, R.2037, purports to be a "billing and payment history" although it 
does not even indicate what client is involved. 
Thus, when the trial court entered its Memorandum Decision on attorney fees, 
R.2171-74, the court implied that, where the court did not observe Mr. Carlile's work, it 
was dependent on Mr. Carlile's affidavit to describe that work. In that context, the 
court's finding that "Mr. Carlile's affidavit does little to help" is quite an understatement. 
There is nothing in that affidavit that would allow the court to judge the work done by 
Mr. Carlile. 
After the ruling, Mr. Hughes filed another motion asking the court to modify its 
decision on attorney fees. R.2257-61. Mr. Carlile then filed another affidavit. R. 2193-
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2251. While the supporting exhibits show billing statements and it can be discerned that 
Mr. Carlile worked on the case, his affidavit again contains no explanation of what he did 
and how his actions benefitted the Trusts. R.2250. Moreover, there was no explanation 
why he did not file an appropriate affidavit in the first instance. 
Without the filing of opposition memoranda, the trial court denied the motion for 
modification because, "under the circumstances, it could not fairly and equitably weigh 
Mr. Carlile's services with regard to the ultimate decision rendered by this Court." 
R.2264. The court was particularly troubled because of Mr. Carlile's withdrawal 
immediately before the first trial date (requiring the trial to be rescheduled) (R.1618), and 
the effect that had on the expenses all other parties incurred as a result of John's pro se 
representation. R.2265. 
The court could have also denied the motion on the basis that it was simply a 
motion for rehearing under URCP Rule 59, without addressing the reasons when a 
rehearing can be allowed under Rule 59. Interstate Land Corporation v. Patterson, 140 
Utah App. Rep. 36, 797 P.2d 101 l(App. Ct. 1990). Mr. Hughes motion did not address 
any of the seven grounds for reconsideration set forth in Rule 59(a). See R.2257-61. 
In addition, the trial court could have denied the motion on the basis that Mr. 
Carlile's services were used to help the Contestants breach their duties in Exhibit 20. See 
R.1451 and 1517. 
Given this record, the Contestants have failed to establish any basis for reversing 
Judge Taylor's ruling as to Mr. Carlile's fees. 
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11. The Contestants Repeatedly Mischaracterize the Record. 
As shown above, the Contestants make numerous unsupported statements and 
statements that mischaracterize the record. But there are others not discussed above. 
Here are the Contestants' allegations followed by Rikki's and Joe's response (in italics 
type). 
a. Mac and Leora had other accounts and funds separate from the trusts. The 
evidence suggests Mac and Leora intended to protect the funds paid to the 1993 
Irrevocable Trust from "their children." Appellees' Brief. There is no record evidence to 
support these claims. To the contrary, where Leora signed an agreement promising to 
return $100,000 of Marital Trust assets to the Marital Trust on March 9, 1993 (Exhibit 
212) and then had Mac sign the Irrevocable Trust on March 18, 1993 giving her the right 
to take all of the assets of that trust after Mac's death (Exhibit 4 §2.01(b)), the evidence 
shows Leora would have had the right to take that money and give it to her children to 
the exclusion of Mac's. 
b. Rikki's and Joe's argument that Joe's fees should not be determined by a 
contract between Mac and Rikki (Exhibits 14 and 15) contradicts Rikki's testimony that 
"both she and Joe agreed to abide by the agreement if Mac signed it." Appellees Brief at 
33. The Fee Agreement, Exhibit 32, specifically states that Rikki and Joe would submit to 
Mac disputes regarding when the payment of fees would be made. This is exactly the 
point Rikki made in her testimony. T844-45; see also T 1163 (Joe's testimony). There 
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is no contradiction between this, and Joe not being bound by an agreement between Rikki 
and Mac. 
c. Joe charged the Trust for opposing Linnea's successful effort to appoint 
Leora and herself conservators of Mac's estate. Appellees' Brief at 34. As the March 
1994 Conservatorship/Guardianship Order shows, Rikki and Joe stipulated to the 
appointment of Leora as conservator and Leora and Joe as co-guardians. Exhibit 12. 
Moreover, Linnea did not petition the court for Leora 's appointment as conservator and 
guardian. She sought her own appointment. Exhibit 205. 
d. The March 1994 Order in the Utah Guardianship/Conservatorship reversed 
Rikki's and Joe's efforts to disregard the 1993 Amendment to the Trust. (Appellees' 
Brief at 35.) The Order makes no reference to the March 1993 Amendment to the Trust. 
See Exhibit 12. See also discussion at page 1 above. 
e. The March 1994 Conservatorship/Guardianship Order appointed Leora and 
Linnea as co-conservators and Leora as Mac's sole guardian. Appellees' Brief at 35. 
That Order appointed Leora as Mac's sole conservator and Leora and Joe as Mac's co-
guardians. Exhibit 12. 
f. When the Contestants' first Affidavit of Succession (Exhibit 13) was 
presented to Rikki and Joe, they rejected it without response. Appellees' Brief at 39. 
Linnea testified that Rikki and Joe told her, consistent with Mr. Morrison's letter of 
explanation (Exhibit 47), that "they were trustees for life. " T.296-298. 
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g. Rikki's and Joe's retention of trust records was illegal. Appellants' Brief at 
39. Each of Contestants' affidavits naming Trustees named Rikki and Joe as co-Trustees. 
Exhibits 13, 17, and 18. Thus, even under these documents, Rikki and Joe were entitled 
to hold the trust records. 
h. The action taken by the Contestants in Exhibit 17 was reaffirmed in Exhibit 
18; Rikki and Joe continued to "usurp" authority after the execution of Exhibit 17. 
Appellees' Brief at 40. The Contestants executed Exhibit 18 on October 17, 1995 and 
Exhibit 17 on October 15,1996. The day after Exhibit 17 was executed, the parties 
stipulated to the appointment of an independent accountant to administer the trusts. 
R.802-06. If Rikki and Joe continued to ^ usurp " the trusteeship after the execution of 
Exhibit 17, they did so for only one day. 
CONCLUSION 
Rikki and Joe ask the Court of Appeals to reverse the trial court's refusal to grant 
them judgment on the pleadings as they stood at the time of the initial hearing on 
September 24, 1999. Thus, the Court should order that the trust assets be distributed in 
five equal shares. 
If the Court fails to grant this relief, Rikki and Joe ask the Court to reverse the trial 
court's award of attorney fees to Linnea. Further, they ask the Court to reverse the trial 
court's decision on their normal trustee fees and to order the trial court to enter an order 
approving the normal trustee fees as paid. They also ask the Court to reverse the trial 
court's ruling that disallowed Mr. Middaugh's fees and to order the trial court to allow 
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that expense. Further, they ask the Court to reverse the trial court's denial of Joe's claim 
for extraordinary fees and remand to the trial court for a determination of what amount of 
fees would be reasonable in light of the circumstances. Finally, if this matter is remanded 
for further proceedings, they ask that the Court reverse the trial court's ruling preventing 
Rikki and Joe from establishing facts in support of their claim that the Contestants were 
unqualified to be trustees. 
Dated this 2 . day of October, 2001. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Charles M. Berinett 
Attorneys for Eva M. (Rikki) Cafferty 
and Joseph M. Hughes 
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